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BETTER AMERICA BONDS: BETTER IS IN THE EYE OF THE
BEHOLDER
ROBERT A. FISHER
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 11, 1999, Vice President Gore announced a "Livability
Agenda."' The purpose of the Livability Agenda is "to ensure a high
quality of life and strong, sustainable economic growth.",2 The goals of
the Livability Agenda include the preservation of "green spaces that
promote clean air and clean water, sustain wildlife, and provide families
with places to walk, play and relax." 3 To that end, a program called Better
America Bonds was introduced in early 1999.4 Better America Bonds are
tax-credit bonds designed to aid local communities with problems
involving open spaces, water quality, and abandoned, contaminated
industrial sites known as "brownfields." 5  Although the problems
addressed by Better America Bonds are not at issue here and in fact, for
purposes of this writing, the problems are deemed to exist, the use of
Better America Bonds to solve such problems, even partially, is bad
policy. The following is a discussion of the structure and purposes of the
Better America Bond program, an exploration into the flaws of Better
America Bonds, and finally a look at alternatives.
In Part II, the discussion centers on the Better America Bonds
program, specifically, the purposes for and the details of the program.
Part III is a discussion of traditional tax-exempt bonds as compared to tax-
credit bonds such as Better America Bonds. Part IV is a discussion of the
favorable aspects of Better America Bonds. Part V focuses on the
disadvantages of Better America Bonds. In Part VI, alternatives to Better
" Mr. Fisher received B.B.A. and M.S. degrees in Accounting from Texas Tech
University, and expects to receive a J.D. from the William and Mary School of Law in
2001. The author wishes to thank his wife, Laurie, and his two daughters, Alex and
Sydney, for their patience and support during the writing of this Note.
I Office of the Vice President, Press Release, Clinton-Gore Livability Agenda: Building
Livable Communities for the 21st Century (Jan. 11, 1999), at http://www.pub.
whitehouse.gov/uries/l2R? :pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/l/ 11/14.text. 1.
2 See id.
3See id.
See id.
5 See id.
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America Bonds are discussed. Finally, Part VII concludes with a selection
of the best alternative.
II. WHAT ARE BETTER AMERICA BONDS?
As America's population has expanded urban sprawl has become a
6major issue in communities across the country. What were once sparsely
populated areas of farm and ranch land have become highly concentrated
caches of house farms buffered by super retailers and twenty-four screen
cinemas.7 As the American people continue their migration away from the
cities, and as cities continue to grow outward with development,
compromises occur where open spaces and water quality are concerned.8
Open spaces are gobbled up by hungry home consumers, 9 and then by the
necessary support for these consumers, i.e., grocery stores, convenience
stores, dry cleaners, car dealerships, restaurants, etc.' 0  Open spaces
become scarce, people move farther away, and the cycle begins again. I
With the construction of new roads and parking lots to support the
increased motor vehicle traffic that necessarily follows massive sprawl,
water quality is adversely affected due to the runoff from such roads and
parking lots.' 2 When it rains, the oils, salts, grime, and other contaminants
are carried by the rainwater into nearby lakes, streams, rivers, and even
water tables and other sources of drinking water. 13 "Most water pollution
today is attributable to runoff...
Another problem for many localities results from the "lingering
effects of past practices in toxic waste storage and disposal."' 15 Some sites
formerly used for a variety of industrial and commercial purposes have
problems ranging from "large quantities of buried waste of unknown
toxicity to leaking gasoline tanks at automobile service stations."' 6 The
6 See Douglas R. Porter, Reinventing Growth Management for the 21" Century, 23 WM.
& MARY ENVTL. L. POL'Y REV. 705, 711-12 (1999).
7 See id. at 708.
8 See LAND USE IN AMERICA 5 (Henry L Diamond & Patrick F. Noonan eds., 1996).
9 See Porter, supra note 6, at 705.
10 See id. at 708.
11 See id. at 706-12.
12 See LAND USE IN AMERICA, supra note 8, at 75-77.
See id. at 322.
14 See id. at 77.
15 Douglas R. Porter, MANAGING GROWTH IN AMERICA'S COMMUNITIES 195 (1997).
16 Id. at 196.
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latter types are known as "brownfields".17 Many communities have these
brownfields sitting dormant because the cost of clean up is prohibitive.
1 8
Financial aid for communities burdened with strained open spaces,
water quality problems, or abandoned, contaminated land is now being
proposed. Open space preservation, restoration, and enhancement;
brownfields clean up and recovery; and water quality restoration and
protection: all of these goals are at the heart of the Better America Bonds
program.
20
The Better America Bonds program is designed to provide federal
assistance to local communities, enabling them to borrow money for
environmental projects at no cost.21 Currently existing as a stand-alone
bill introduced by Rep. Robert Matsui and co-sponsored by 120 House
Members,22 and as a provision in the tax bill vetoed by President Clinton
in September of 1999,23 the Better America Bonds program would aid
local communities by allowing them to issue bonds to finance certain
environmental projects.24 According to the EPA, the permitted projects
are those that attempt to accomplish the following:
Preserve and Enhance Open Space: State, Tribal and
local governments can create, restore or enhance parks,
preserve green spaces, and protect threatened farmland
and wetlands. Land can be protected either by
acquiring title or purchasing permanent easements.
Protect Water Quality: Rivers, lakes coastal waters, and
wetlands-and drinking water sources-can be restored
or protected through reducing polluted runoff, the
largest remaining threat to the nation's waterways.
Eligible projects to curb runoff include purchase of
sensitive lands, wetlands restoration, settling ponds, and
17 Id.
18 See Environmental Protection Agency, Better America Bonds, Frequently Asked
Questions, at http://www.epa.gov/bonds/faqs.hlm [hereinafter Frequently Asked Quest-
ions].
19See Environmental Protection Agency, Better America Bonds, at http://www.epa.gov/
bonds/ [hereinafter Better America Bonds].
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 See Amy B. Resnick, Clock is Ticking on Environment, Conservation Bond
Legislation, THE BOND BUYER, Oct. 1, 1999, available at 1999 WL 19926199.
23 See id.
24 See Better America Bonds, supra note 19.
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the creation of planted or forested buffer strips along
waterways.
Clean Up Brownfields: Pressure to develop green space
can be eased through cleaning up and reusing
brownfields-abandoned, contaminated industrial sites.
Communities can assess and clean up brownfields for
use as open space or for redevelopment (in most cases)
where the brownfield is owned by the local govern-
ment.
25
The interest on Better America Bonds is ,aid not by the issuing
communities but rather by the federal government. Payment would be in
the form of a tax credit that could be applied against the current federal
income tax liability of an investor,27 or, if the credit exceeds the current
tax liability, the investor could carry the credit forward for up to five
years.28 In essence the tax credit is a direct subsidy; it is as if the federal
government were paying the interest on a taxable bond in cash. 29 The
Joint Committee on Taxation offers the following explanation:
Though called a tax credit, the Federal subsidy for [Better
America Bonds] is equivalent to the Federal Government
directly paying the interest on a taxable bond on behalf of
the State or local government that benefits from the bond
proceeds. To see this, consider any taxable bond that bears
an interest rate of 10 percent. A thousand dollar bond
would thus produce an payment of $100 annually. The
owner of the bond that receives this payment would receive
a net payment of $100 less the taxes owed on that interest.
If the taxpayer were in the 28-percent Federal tax bracket,
such taxpayer would receive $72 after Federal taxes.
Regardless of whether the State government or the Federal
Government pays the interest, the taxpayer receives the
25 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
26 See Better America Bonds, supra note 19.
27 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
28 See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF. THE
ADMINISTRATION'S REVENUE PROPOSALS 30 (1999), at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/
releases/grnbk99.htm.
29 See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 14
(Comm. Print 1999).
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same net of tax return of. $72. In the case of tax credit
bonds, no formal interest is paid by the Federal
Government. Rather, a tax credit of $100 is allowed to be
taken by the holder of the bond. In general, a $100 tax
credit would be worth $100 to a taxpayer, provided that the
taxpayer had at least $100 in tax liability. However, for tax
credit bonds, the $100 credit also has to be claimed as
income. Claiming an additional $100 in income costs a
taxpayer in the 28-percent tax bracket an additional $28 in
income taxes, payable to the Federal Government. With
the $100 tax credit that is ultimately claimed, the taxpayer
nets $72 on the bond. The Federal Government loses $100
on the credit, but recoups $28 of that by the requirement
that it be included in income, for a net cost of $72, which is
exactly the net return to the taxpayer. If the Federal
Government had simply agreed to pay the interest on behalf
of the State or local government, both the Federal
Government and the bondholder/taxpayer would be in the
same situation.
30
The tax credit represents a significant subsidy by the federal
government.31
Tax-credit bonds such as Better America Bonds should not be
confused with tax-exempt bonds. With tax-exempt bonds, the issuer pays
the interest, but the interest is not taxable income to the investor.
32
Because the investor is not required to pay federal income tax on the
interest income from a tax-exempt bond, the bond can be issued at a lower
rate of interest than a taxable bond and still provide the same after-tax rate
of return, depending on the tax bracket of the individual investor.
33
In contrast, with a tax-credit bond the issuer does not pay the
interest on the bond.34 Rather, the federal government pays the interest in
the form of a tax credit.35 The investor is taxed on the tax credit received
30 Id. at 18-19.
31 See Amy B. Resnick, The Cost of Complexity: Tax-Credit Debt Subsidy Requires
Oversight, THE BOND BUYER, June 15, 1999, available at WL 19922913.
32 See WILLIAM F. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS 202 (2nd ed. 1981).
33 See id. at 203. Generally taxpayers in the 30 percent to 40 percent tax bracket find that
the return on tax-exempt bonds is competitive with the after-tax return on taxable bonds.
See id.
34 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
35 See id.
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as if the interest were paid in cash.36 Because the investor receives no tax
break, the interest rate on the bond must be the same as that on other
taxable bonds in order for the investor to receive a competitive return on
the investment and thus be willing to invest.37
Although the federal government pays the interest, the federal
government does not guarantee the return of principal. 38 As is the case
with most tax-exempt bonds, the issuers will be required to establish and
make regular payments into a sinking fund to provide for the return of
principal when the bonds mature.39  Another similarity to tax-exempt
bonds is that Better America Bonds are freely negotiable. In fact, it has
been suggested that the tax credit interest payments be severable from the
actual bonds, in the form of coupons that could be freely negotiated.4 '
As is the case for other federal programs, funds are limited. The
proposal is for $700 million in tax credits over five years. 42 This equates
to $1.9 billion in bond authority that could be given each year.43 Because
the funds are limited, a selection process is necessary.44 One might think
that a program such as this should be allocated to the states based on some
criteria such as population. That is not the case.45 Because rapid growth
and sprawl problems vary from state to state, to enable local communities
to have direct access to the resources and to "encourage stronger, more
creative and innovative aplications,' 46 the process for gaining bond
authority is competitive. The Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") will chair a panel of government agencies including the
48Department of the Interior and the Treasury Department. The panel will
JC See id.
37See generally Sharpe, supra note 32, at 4-10.
38 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
39 See id.
40 See id.
See Tax Benefits for Land Conservation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106TH Cong. (1999) (testimony of Deputy
Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Analysis Leonard Burman).
42 See id.
43See id.
44 See Better America Bonds, supra note 19.
45 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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decide on the necessary criteria on which to base decisions about granting
bond authority.
49
Although the criteria have yet to be determined, they will be based
on three principles.5 0 First, the purpose of the bonds must fall under one
or more of the three categories of allowed uses: open space preservation,
brownfields clean up, and water quality protection.5 1 Second, there must
be evidence of strong community support.5 2 Third, collaborative efforts of
neighboring communities, especially among cities, suburbs and rural
areas, will be given preference. 3 In addition, any local rules regarding the
issuance of bonds would still apply to Better America Bonds.14  For
instance, if a county would normally require a referendum before a bond
or other debt issuance could occur, such referendum would still be
required.5 5 Naturally, the voter approval could be contingent on the award
of bond authority from the EPA.
The EPA will administer the Better America Bonds program, but,
like the issuers of tax-exempt bonds, the issuers of Better America Bonds
will be under the watchful eye of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").
57
If, during the fifteen year term of the bond more than five percent of the
proceeds are used for anything other than the allowed uses, the accrual of
tax credits will cease, the issuer will have to reimburse the IRS for credits
that accrued within the previous three years, with interest, and, if the
issuer cannot pay, the bondholders will be liable for the reimbursement.
58
When the fifteen year term is up and the principal has been
returned to the investors, one further restriction remains. If the property
financed with Better America Bonds is to be sold, environmental
protection organizations must be given the right of first refusal to purchase
the land.5 9
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
58 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 29, at 54.
59 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
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III. COMPARING TAX-EXEMPT BONDS WITH TAX-CREDIT BONDS
Touched upon briefly above is the difference between tax-exempt
bonds and tax-credit bonds such as Better America Bonds. A more
detailed analysis of the differences and the similarities is in order. From a
purely financial standpoint the difference for the issuer is quite striking.
As previously mentioned, an issuer borrows money at a lower rate of
interest when issuing a tax-exempt bond.6° For the investor, the lower
interest received is compensated for by the fact that the interest received is
not subject to federal income tax.6' In effect, the federal government
subsidizes the savings for the issuer.62 Compare tax-credit bonds, where
the federal government is subsidizing the entire interest payment. Stated
another way, the issuer is able to borrow money for free. Leonard
Burman, Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Analysis, explained
the difference as follows:
Compared to traditional tax-exempt bonds, Better America
Bonds would significantly reduce the financing costs to
local taxpayers of environmental projects. For example,
annual payments of principal and interest on a traditional
30-year, $1 million tax-exempt bond issue would, at current
interest rates, be about $71,000. In comparison, the annual
payments into a sinking fund that would repay after 15
years the $1 million principal of an issue of Better America
Bonds would be about $42,000. A state or local
government issuing the bonds would thus save about
$29,000 per year over the initial 15 years, and $71,000 per
year over the remaining 15 years of a 30-year bond's term.
Better America Bonds would cost state and local
governments only about half of what a tax-exempt bond
would (in present value terms).63
Thus the subsidy provided to localities via Better America
Bonds is much deeper than the subsidy accompanying tax-
exempt bonds.64
60 See supra text accompanying note 33.
61 See supra text accompanying note 33.
62 Resnick, supra note 3 1.
63 Tax Benefits for Land Conservation, supra note 41.
64See Resnick, supra note 31.
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Along with the financial differences between tax-exempt and tax-
credit bonds there are differences between the respective markets for such
bonds. The market for tax-exempt bonds is well established as it has been
around for many years.65 Issuers, investors, traders, and brokers are all
familiar with the tax-exempt bond market.66  As a result, tax-exempt
bonds are predictable and comfortable, and for investors, risk of the
unknown is absent.67 Of course other types of risk are present, such as the
risk that some or all of the principal will not be paid and the risk that the
purpose for which the bond proceeds are used will fail to remain qualified
and thus the bonds will lose preferential tax status. 68 However, the market
has long since adjusted the price for these and many other risks.6 9
Because the investors are comfortable in that they are able to accurately
predict the results of their investments, it is not necessary for issuers to
offer tax-exempt bonds at a discount in order to sell them, other than the
discount (or premium) necessary to account for any changes in the market
interest rate between the printing of the bonds and the sale of the bonds.7 °
Another consequence of having a well established market is that
the costs involved in issuing and servicing tax-exempt bonds have had
time to decline as the attorneys, brokers, and issuers have become familiar
with the specifics of the process. 71 The learning curve was passed long
ago.72 Previously unforeseen contingencies have been confronted and
adjustments have been made.73
65 See The Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, Conservation, and Preservation: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106dh Cong.
Q1999) (prepared statement of the Bond Market Association).
6 See id.
67 See id.
68 See generally Sharpe, supra note 32, at 289-317.
69 See generally id.
70 For instance, if a bond is offered with a stated annual interest rate of eight percent, but
at the time of issuance the market rate for such a bond has increased to nine percent, the
issuer must sell the bond for less than face value, i.e., at a discount, to compensate the
buyer for the below-market interest rate that accompanies the bond. See generally
Sharpe, supra note 32, at 290-94. The discount effectively increases the investor's
return. Conversely, if the market rzte decreases, the bond can be sold at a premium,
thereby reducing the investor's rate of return down to a level more in line with the
market. See id.
71 See generally The Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, Conservation, and Preservation,
supra note 65.
72 See generally id.
73 See generally id.
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Related to the risk of the unknown is the risk that the issuer will
fail to repay. In a well-established market such as the tax-exempt bond
market, many issuers have issued bonds in the past and have a history.74
This enables bond rating companies to make predictions as to the risk
involved in dealing with a particular issuer.75 As the name suggests, bond
rating companies actually assess the risk of default, or conversely the
probability that an issuer will pay as agreed, and publish a grade or rating
for bond issuers alerting investors of the relative risk involved in
purchasing bonds from a particular issuer.76
Perhaps the most advantageous quality of a mature market is the
fact that a market actually exists.77  Buyers are available.78  There is
already a demand. 79 Even when bonds are issued with a low rating, the
bonds can still be sold because the risk is known.80 In order to accomplish
this, the bonds are discounted to compensate for the increased risk.8
The tax-credit bond market is almost nonexistent." The few tax-credit bonds that have been issued are Qualified Zone Academy Bonds.8 3
14 See Sharpe, supra note 32, at 305-08.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See The Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, Conservation, and Preservation: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 1061h Cong.
1999) (prepared statement of the Bond Market Association).
8 See id.
79 See id.80 See Sharpe, supra note 32, at 305-15.
See id.
82 See The Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, Conservation, and Preservation: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106"h Cong.
1999) (prepared statement of the Bond Market Association).
3 See Fowler W. Martin, U.S. Bond Market Association Welcomes Treasury QZAB Rate
Moves, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, July 2, 1999 (WL, DJNSPLUS Database). Qualified
Zone Academy Bonds are tax-credit bonds issued by a state or local government the
proceeds of which are used for renovations, equipment, course materials development,
and teacher training at certain schools categorized as "qualified zone academies." JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 29, at 14. The following is a description of a
"qualified zone academy":
A School is a "qualified zone academy" if (1) the school is a public
school that provides education and training below the college level, (2)
the school operates a special academic program in cooperation with
businesses to enhance the academic curriculum and increase graduation
and employment rates, and (3) either (a) the school is located in one of
the 31 designated empowerment zones or one of the 95 designated
enterprise communities, or (b) it is reasonably expected that at least 35
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The universe of taxpayers permitted to be holders of Qualified Zone
Academy Bonds is limited to include banks, insurance companies, and
other institutions actively engaged in the business of lending money.
8 4
Furthermore, because the interest is paid in the form of a tax credit, the
pool of investors is pragmatically limited to those lenders who can take
advantage of a tax credit. Qualified Zone Academy Bonds have only been
in existence a short time.ss The total issuance was limited to $400 million
per year.8 6 The narrow universe of eligible investors and the relatively
low annual issuance limit have combined to stifle the emergence of a tax-
credit bond market.8 7
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF BETTER AMERICA BONDS
The positive aspects of the Better America Bonds program include
the following: First, the environmental purposes behind the program,
assuming the underlying problems and potential problems do in fact exist,
are certainly laudable and worthy of encouragement. Second, the money
spent (actually forgone) by the federal government would be leveraged
into greater spending power. Third, because a tax credit is allowed in lieu
of a cash interest payment, a tax credit that is not refundable and that
expires in five years, there is a chance that the credits will not be used in
full or that their use will be deferred, thus reducing the cost of the
program. In addition, because cash is not paid out, the program avoids the
often unpleasant appropriations process. Finally, the bureaucracies,
namely the EPA and the IRS, are already in place to administer and police
the program.
Many communities have expressed a desire for more livable
communities that include "more green spaces, less traffic congestion,
improved water and air quality, and enhanced quality of life." 8  That
desire is evidenced by data from the 1998 election, where "240 'green'
ballot initiatives were considered in communities across the country."
8 9
percent of the students at the school will be eligible for free or reduced-
cost lunches under the school lunch program established under the
National School Lunch Act.
Id. at 14-15.
84 See id.
85 See id.
86 Id.
87 See id.
88 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
89 Id.
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Over half of these measures "to protect open space and enhance local
livability were adopted." 9  Those ballot initiatives authorized an
additional $7.5 billion in state and local spending. 9' Certainly $9.5 billion
in bonding authority would help communities with these problems.
However, the federal government will not be paying $9.5 billion; the tax
credits allowed over five years would total approximately $700 million.92
The ability to leverage large amounts of directed spending at a
relatively low cost is one of the great advantages of subsidizing a bond
issue. Although the leverage is greater with tax-exempt bonds where the
federal government subsidizes only a portion of the interest, Better
America Bonds "provide a much deeper subsidy for communities. '" 93 For
example, the issuer of a million dollar bond would save nearly 60 percent
over a fifteen year period. 94 In reality, however, as the following
explanation will show, the actual cost will probably be even less.
Because interest is "paid" in the form of a tax credit, there is a
chance that the "payment" will be delayed or even remain unpaid. The
reason for this is that the tax credit is not refundable. 95 It can only be used
to reduce a tax liability.96 If the tax liability is less than the credit, the
credit can be carried forward for five years. 97 After five years the unused
portion of the credit is lost.98 Obviously if the credit is lost in whole or in
part the program cost is reduced. However, even if the credit is merely
delayed the program cost is likewise reduced. 99 The worst case scenario
for the federal government is that in which the program operates as
expected and all bondholders are able to use all of their tax credits in the
year in which they were earned. Otherwise, use of the credits is delayed
or credits expire unused. Either way the government enjoys a savings,
reducing the overall program cost.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See id.
93 Better America Bonds, supra note 19.
Id.
95 See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 28.
96 See id.
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 The time value of money is the reason for the lower program cost when a tax credit is
not taken in the year it is earned. At the very least, the government will enjoy the free
use of the revenue not currently forgone due to the delayed tax credit.
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Because tax credits are used instead of cash payments,
appropriations from Congress are unnecessary.' 00 Naturally, Congress
must pass the provision, but getting a program passed and getting a
program funded are two separate hurdles. Funding a program with a
multiyear bond program would "avoid making [the program] subject to the
often-unpredictable federal appropriations process.
The final favorable characteristic of Better America Bonds is that
the bureaucracy currently exists to administer and police the program.
0 2
The EPA is staffed with experienced professionals who have previously
worked with local communities on water quality projects and brownfields
clean up.103 Once the projects have been approved and bond authority has
been given, the IRS steps in to police the various projects.10 4 Currently
the IRS is responsible for insuring that tax-exempt bond funds are being
used for allowed purposes. 10 5 Thus, bureaucracy exists to oversee the use
of tax-credit bond funds.
The EPA sums up the program as follows: This is not a big
government program. The federal government will not
purchase one square inch of land. Nor will it micromanage
local zoning and land use decisions. States and
communities will build this legacy themselves. All
decisions will be made at the state or local level. The
federal government is just providing them new tools they
need to grow in ways that are best for them.
10 6
100 In fact, being a part of the appropriations process may not work at all. Bruce Davie, a
Treasury Department economist, explained the problem as follows:
Budgetary policies and budgetary rules don't permit the creation of a
pot of money to write checks to issuers to pay interest. Using the tax
system and (tax-credit bonds) are [sic] the only way we have been able
to think of to deliver a deeper subsidy than traditional tax-exempt
bonds.
Amy B. Resnick, EPA Defends Tax Credits, THE BOND BUYER, Mar. 3, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 5728888.
101 Resnick, The Cost of Complexity, supra note 31 (quoting from an interview with
Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy Jonathan Talisman).
102 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
103 See id
104 See id.
105 See WEST'S FEDERAL TAXATION 1-18 (William H. Hoffman, Jr. et al. eds., 1997)
(stating that the IRS is responsible for administering the tax laws); I.R.C. § 103 (1999)
E roviding for the tax-exempt status of certain bonds).
Better America Bonds, supra note 19.
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V. THE DISADVANTAGES OF BETTER AMERICA BONDS
On the surface Better America Bonds appear to be a great way to
help communities help themselves and the environment. However, there
are significant disadvantages. First, there is a possibility that no new
projects will be funded with the tax-credit bonds, and instead projects that
were going to be funded with tax-exempt bonds will now be funded with
more highly subsidized tax-credit bonds, and even if more open space is
created, the change may be incremental. Second, the pool of investors is
limited, the market is virtually nonexistent, and the risks may force
investors to keep it that way. Third, Better America Bonds will not
provide cost free borrowing as promised. Fourth, the program may
discriminate against poorer communities. Fifth, local communities may
relinquish some control over their projects. In addition, avoiding the
appropriations process may unjustly favor environmental projects over
other projects and programs. Finally, the IRS should not be burdened with
yet another policing function, putting more pressure on an exceedingly
understaffed agency, and the tax code should not be made more complex
with policy provisions that have nothing to do with assessing and
collecting taxes.
Having tax-exempt bonds available is great for localities because,
as explained above, the cost of borrowing is partially subsidized by the
federal government. 10 7 However, making Better America Bonds available
could be problematic financially for the federal government. The danger
is that localities will only shift already existing plans that were to be
financed with tax-exempt bonds into the Better America Bonds
program. 108 The problem is that the federal government will end up fully
subsidizing the borrowing for a plan which would have come to fruition
had the borrowing been subsidized only in part through the use of tax-
exempt bonds. 10 9 Actually the plan need not be in existence for the
problem to occur. So long as the project would have been undertaken
using tax-exempt bonds, the project, if financed with Better America
Bonds, would represent an unnecessary cost to the federal government." 10
Not only would there be unnecessary costs involved, but the
purpose of the program, to spur localities to instigate more environmental
projects to enhance open space, improve water quality and clean up
1U7 See supra text accompanying note 2.
108See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 29, at 18.
109 id.
See id.
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brownfields, would "not be achieved.""' If no new projects emerge, the
program would be nothing more than a revenue loser with nothing to show
for it save some colorful environmental propaganda in the form of
brochures, web pages, and maybe some Microsoft PowerPoint
presentations. However, the localities would realize a windfall which they
could "spend the savings on other government functions or use to reduce
taxes."" Furthermore, even if there were environmental changes of the
type contemplated by Vice President Gore, et al., the changes could be
incremental.
The incremental increase problem could occur if, for example, a
locality had a pre-existing plan for land acquisition to build a park and
thus increase open space. If the locality were able to gain authority to
issue Better America Bonds instead of issuing tax-exempt bonds, the
money saved could then be used to acquire more land for the park. As a
result, instead of encouraging the creation of new projects, Better America
Bonds would merely be allowing for an incremental expansion of existing
plans. If this occurs the valuable leverage on federal funds is all but lost;
the amount of environmental help has increased, but only by an amount
equal to the additional subsidy provided by the Better America Bonds
program. In other words, the subsidy may not encourage new projects.
The subsidy may just moderately increase the size of the projects by an
amount equal to the present value of the future interest payment savings
realized by the localities.
In the unlikely event that all Better America Bonds projects are
neither replacements for nor additions to prior plans of local projects, i.e.,
even if the program encourages only the creation of new projects, the
bonds still must be sold. That requires a market of willing investors. The
pool of investors for Better America Bonds is smaller than that of other
bonds. 113 For an investor to be willing to buy a tax-credit bond, that
investor must have a federal tax liability to which the tax credit can be
applied. 14 Immediately the investor pool is limited to domestic taxpayers,
individuals and corporations. 1 5 Furthermore, there are some large
I Id.
112 Id.
113 See Amy B. Resnick, TBMA Says Tax-Credit Plan Flawed, THE BOND BUYER, Mar.
11, 1999, available at 1999 WL 5729152.
114 See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 29, at 15-16 (describing that in lieu
of an interest payment, a credit would be given for federal income tax purposes).
115 See Resnick, supra note 113 (reasoning that only domestic individuals and
corporations would actually have a potential tax liability to which a tax credit could be
applied).
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investors that pay no income tax. 1 6  Pension funds have become
substantial investors in securities markets. 1 7 However, income earned in
pension funds is not taxed currently. 1 8 Rather, the income is taxed when
distributed to pensioners, and the pensioners are then liable for the tax.
119
Thus the pension fund managers would have no interest in tax credits that
they could not use. Assuming that the remaining pool of potential
investors is adequate to support a tax-credit bond market, there is still
something missing-a market! There exist investors who are not
completely adverse to tax-credit bonds, 120 i.e., investors who potentially
could have a tax liability to which the credit could be applied, but a market
requires investors who are willing to purchase the bonds.
For an investor to be willing to purchase any investment, the return
must be sufficient to compensate the investor for the risk associated with
the investment. 12 1 With Better America Bonds the risks are significant.
First, there is no secondary market; thus the bonds have poor liquidity, if
any.122 Second, the bonds could be issued by a group of smaller
communities, 123 none of which have the financial resources to pay into the
sinking fund extra money to cover for an insolvent co-issuer. Third, if at
some point the proceeds from the bonds are not used for an allowed
purpose, 124 the tax credits will be lost; 125 in addition, the investors may be
liable to the IRS for repayment of tax credits already taken.126 Fourth, the
value of the tax credit depends on the tax situation of the investor.
127
As mentioned previously, tax-credit bonds are relatively new. 128
The only ones actually in existence are Qualified Zone Academy
Bonds.129 Because these bonds can only be held by investors such as
116 See infra text accompanying notes 117-18.
117 See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 570
J1995).18 See WEST'S FEDERAL TAXATION, supra note 105, at 19-11.
119 See id.
120 See Resnick, supra note 113.
121 See Sharpe, supra note 32, at 6-8.
122 See Resnick, supra note 113.
123 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
124 See supra text accompanying note 51.
125 See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 28, at 31.
126 See id.
127 See Resnick, supra note 113.
128 See supra text accompanying note 85.
129See supra text accompanying note 83.
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banks, insurance companies, and other institutions actively engaged in the
business of lending money, 130 and because of the small volume,"' there is
no secondary market.132 Even if Better America Bonds were added to the
potential market, along with the other proposed type of tax-credit bonds
called School Modernization Bonds, the situation would not improve, i.e.,
a secondary market would either not exist or it would be very small.' 3
3
The Bond Market Association describes the expectation as follows:
[T]he relatively small size of the tax-credit market-$29
billion over five years if the [Better America Bonds and
School Modernization Bonds] programs are enacted-
"would ensure that little secondary market trading" in tax-
credit bonds would take place, making them illiquid
investments. As a result, investors would demand a higher
rate of return from issuers as compensation. 13
4
Thus investors would be forced to hold the bonds until maturity, which
further increases risk.
135
Risk is also increased due to the nature of the preferences that will
be given by the EPA when determining the projects to which it will award
bond authority. The EPA will give preference to "regional proposals that
reflect collaborative planning by neighboring communities."1 36
Participants in these regional proposals may or may not have ever been
involved in a bond issue, but even if all participants have a bond rating,
the investor has the unenviable task of reconciling the different ratings to
arrive at a risk level. 137 Then the risk must be increased to consider the
possibility that one or more of the participants will become unable to
continue contributions to the sinking fund.' 8 The remaining participants
130 See Martin, supra note 83 and text accompanying note 84.
131 See Martin, supra note 83. The "small volume" to which the article refers is $400
million per year in 1997 and 1998. See supra text accompanying note 84.
132 See supra text accompanying note 84.
133See Resnick, supra note 113.
134 Id.
135 See generally Sharpe, supra note 32, at 301-03 (discussing how bond prices are
calculated over time).
136 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
137 See generally Sharpe, supra note 32, at 305-15 (discussing bond ratings and how the
bond's risk of default affects its premiums).
138 Id.
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may be rated as to their own bond issues, but none are rated as to being
able to cover another participant's share.13 9
Another risk that stems from the issuer is the risk that the
requirements of the bonds might be violated.1 40 Those provisions include
strict time periods and proceed percentage limits that must be adhered
to.14 ' The consequences to the investor for mismanagement by the issuer
have the potential to be quite severe.' 42  The Treasury Department
provides the following explanation:
139 Id.
140 For a discussion of permissible projects for the Better America Bonds program, see
supra text accompanying note 25.
14 The following is a description of the bond requirements:
Issuers must reasonably expect, as of the date of issue, that 95 percent
of the proceeds will be expended for qualifying purposes within three
years and that any property financed with bond proceeds will be used
for a qualifyied purpose for at least a 15-year period after the date of
issuance. For purposes of the requirement that 95 percent of tax credit
bond proceeds be used for qualifying purposes, any investment
earnings (and earnings on those earnings) associated with unexpected
proceeds during the three-year period following the date of issuance are
treated as proceeds, i.e., they must also be used for qualifying purposes.
During the three-year period, unexpended proceeds may only be
invested in bank accounts or U.S. Treasury securities maturing in three
years or less. If the issuer establishes a sinking fund to repay principal,
sinking fund assets must be held in State and Local Government
Securities (SLGS) issued by the Treasury. Issuers must incur a binding
obligation with a third party to expend at least 10 percent of the
proceeds of the issue within 6 months of the issue date and allocate the
sale proceeds to expenditures with due diligence. If 95 percent of
proceeds are not expended by the end of the three-year period for
qualifying purposes, unexpended proceeds must be used to retire a
portion of the bonds within 90 days. No depreciation deductions would
be allowed with respect to property financed with tax credit bonds.
Acquisition of land and facilities is only a qualifying purpose if
the property is intended to be available, and is in fact reasonably
available, for use by members of the general public. Any agreement,
other than a management contract that would be a qualified
management contract if the land or facilities had been financed with
tax-exempt bonds, conveying priority rights or other preferential
benefits to a private person violates the general public use provision
and would not constitute a qualifying purpose. Furthermore, repayment
of principal may not be secured or paid with monies derived from
private persons in any capacity other than that of the general public.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 28, at 30-31.
142 See infra text accompanying note 143.
250 [Vol.25:233]
BETTER AMERICA BONDS
Bonds would cease to be qualified bonds and would accrue
no further tax credits after the date on which the use of any
bond-financed facilities changes to a non-qualifying use.
The issuer would be obligated to reimburse the federal
government (with interest) for any credits accruing prior to
that date. If this obligation is not timely paid by the issuer,
the federal government has the right to recover the credit
amount from the current holder of the bonds. In the event
the issuer fails to satisfy one of the other tax-related
requirements, no further tax credits would accrue and the
issuer would be obligated to reimburse the federal
government (with interest) for all past credits claimed with
respect to the bonds. In the event this obligation is not
timely paid by the issuer, the federal government has the
right to recover the credit amount from current bond
holders.143 (emphases added)
It is conceivable that an investor would be liable to the federal government
for the reimbursement of fourteen years of tax credits plus interest. '"
This is certainly a risk that might deter reasonable investors because a debt
to the IRS is unlike any other debt. 145  A tax deficiency can cause
automatic liens to arise on all assets that are currently owned or that may
be acquired in the future, including retirement accounts. 146 Furthermore,
IRS debts enjoy a high preference in bankruptcy, 147 and if any portion of
the debt remains, the liens will survive a bankruptcy. 14 1 Thus, the IRS
should be on everyone's list of undesirable creditors.
Along with risks associated with the issuers are risks inherent in
tax-credit bonds regardless of the issuer. There is a risk that the investor
will be able to use only part of the tax credit that accrued in a given tax
year, or that the tax credit will sit idle for a period of time until the tax
payment is due to be paid.149 The Bond Market Association explains that
143 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 28, at 31.
144 The bonds have a fifteen year term. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
If the use of facilities financed with such bonds changes to a non-qualified use in the
fifteenth year, the taxpayer would be liable for all credits accrued to that date. See supra
text accompanying note 143.
145 See infra text accompanying note 146, at 379-400.
146 See ROBERT S. SCHRIEBMAN, IRS TAX COLLECTION PROCEDURES: A MANUAL FOR
PRACTITIONERS 379-82 (1985).
147 See id. at 388-89.
148 See id. at 395-400.
149 See infra text accompanying note 150.
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a traditional bond is continually generating a return for the investor. In
contrast, "the value of a tax credit under any of the proposed tax credit
bond proposals is largely dependent on timing and on the tax situation of a
particular investor."1 50 An investor earns the ability to take an annual
credit on the anniversary date of a bond's issuance.
[However,] the credit becomes economically valuable to
the investor only when it has the effect of reducing a tax
payment and that occurs only on a day when an investor is
required to make a federal tax payment... because the tax-
credit date-the anniversary of the bond's issuance-may
not coincide with a tax-payment date, . . the investor [is
forced] to incur 'a period of time when the credit has no
significant economic value.' ... The situation is worse for
the investor in years when the investor has no tax
liability."'15
1
Even though the credit may be carried forward, if an investor has no tax
liability and is forced to carry the credit forward, the time period in which
the tax credit has no economic value is extended even further.' 52
To summarize, there are three risks inherent in tax-credit bonds.
First, there is the risk that a tax credit will be "paid," i.e. earned, before the
tax due date; thus, the credit sits idle, losing value over time. Second,
there is the risk that a tax credit will exceed the tax liability; thus, the
remaining credit will sit idle for a year or more until there exists sufficient
tax liability to which the credit can be applied. Third, there is the risk that
some or all of a credit will never be used due the five year limitation on
carryovers.
These risks cannot be compensated for by adjusting the interest
rate on the bonds because the Treasury Department sets the interest rate. 153
Therefore, to compensate investors for the risks discussed above, the bond
must be sold for an amount less than face value. 5 4 "[S]tates and localities
15o Press Release, The Bond Market Association, The Bond Market Association Issues
Statement to Ways and Means Taking Aim at Administration Tax Proposals; Contends
Provisions Would Raise Borrowing Costs and Add Complexity to Systemt; Association
Also Identifies Market Inefficiencies in Tax Credit Bond Proposal (Mar. 10, 1999)
LEXIS, PR Newswire Library).
51Id.
152 Id.
153 See id.
154 See id.
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would invariably be forced to sell bonds at a discount to attract investor
interest.... The difference between the sale price of tax-credit bonds and
their face value would reresent interest cost to the issuer in the form of
original issue discount."' The promise of cost-free borrowing cannot
come to fruition. Because of the lack of a market, low liquidity, and
additional risks inherent in the Better America Bonds program, localities
will have to pay for the use of the proceeds by way of original issue
discount, but that will not relieve the federal government of "paying" the
tax credits, in essence also paying for the localities' use of the proceeds.
156
Furthermore, the discount could be substantial. 157 Compare the Qualified
Zone Academy Bond program where the bonds must be sold "at about 90
percent or 92 percent of par to attract buyers."'158 Even if suggested
improvements were made to the Qualified Zone Academy Bond Program
the bonds could be sold "at almost 96 percent of par.15 The tax-credit
bonds are flawed; cost-free borrowing cannot be achieved using them.'
60
Even if cost-free borrowing were achieved, other problems reside with the
Better America Bonds program, beginning with the competition for
obtaining bond authority.
As stated above, the EPA will administer the program.' 6' One of
its duties will be to award bond authority through a competitive process
where the EPA will scrutinize each proposal from potential issuers and,
using criteria yet to be specifically defined, will decide on the proposals to
be funded with Better America Bonds.' 62 Although the exact criteria have
yet to be determined, the principals on which the criteria will be based
have been set forth.1 63 The EPA wants to "encourage stronger, more
creative and innovative applications from communities across the
nation 164 and "strong community support will be critical."'165 Inherent
within these principles on which the competition will be based is
discrimination against poorer communities in favor of more wealthy
155 See id.
156 See Resnick, supra note 113.
157 Cf Amy B. Resnick, Tax Legislation: State, Local Officials Have Mixed Feelings on
Tax-Credit Debt, THE BOND BUYER, May 14, 1999.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See Resnick, supra note 113.
161 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
162 See id.
163 See id.
164Id.
165 Id.
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communities. "Stronger, more creative and innovative applications" do
not come without cost because applicants may believe it necessary to hire
a professional advertising firm or a marketing firm to produce an
application. Poorer communities may lack the resources to compete with
professionally created application packages.
Wealthier communities also have a distinct advantage in gaining
"strong community support." Naturally, for a community to support a
project the community must be informed of the project. The project must
be "sold" to the community, possibly with the help of a costly information
campaign. Thus the wealthier communities enjoy yet another advantage.
Another problem with Better America Bonds is that the localities
must give up some control over their own agenda while allowing the
federal government to decide which projects are most important.' 66 The
federal government exerts its control over state and local governments in
two ways. First, before the state and local governments can borrow funds
using Better America Bonds, approval must come from the federal
government in the form of bond authority.' 67  Second, the federal
government determines the purposes for which the proceeds may be
used. 168 The effect of the Better America Bonds program could be to
force the federal government's priorities on localities whose priorities may
not mirror those advanced. In effect the federal government is putting
open space preservation "on sale" hoping to get more buyers.
Environmental issues could be placed ahead of other programs that
localities may need such as health clinics for the indigent, food banks, or
homeless shelters. Here the federal government is putting parks on sale
for half-price. 169  If the program is successful in creating only new
projects, the money is coming from some other area of the local budget.
As the Bond Market Association has stated, "[t]ax-credit bond programs,
while commendable for their desire to finance land preservation, would
create another level of federal bureaucracy and would intrude into a
decision-making process that is best left to states and localities.' '
70
1o)See Amy B. Resnick, Debt Committee Members Voice Reservations on Tax Credit
Bonds, THE BOND BUYER, May 25, 1999 available at 1999 WL 5731692.
167 See id.
168 See id.
169 See supra text accompanying note 63.
170 The Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, Conservation, and Preservation: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106,h Cong.
(1999) (LEXIS, Federal News Service) (prepared statement of the Bond Market
Association).
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The federal government does not even attempt to evade the
question of reduced local control. Edwin Oswald, the Treasury
department's attorney advisor for bonds laid out the issue as follows:
The federal subsidy, in connection with traditional tax-
exempt bonds, is limited to the spread between tax-exempt
issues and comparable taxable offerings. When you are
dealing with tax-credit bonds . . .[they represent] a deep
subsidy-a significant subsidy to state and local borrowers,
and with that type of deep subsidy... we think at least at
this juncture, there should be a little more federal oversight
with respect to how those dollars are allocated and what
projects are financed. 171
Jonathan Talisman, deputy assistant Treasury secretary for tax policy,
agreed, adding that "because tax-credit bonds are envisioned as providing
a deeper subsidy-therefore costing the federal government more than
tax-exempt bonds-the federal government has a greater interest in how
they are used.''72 Obviously Oswald and Talisman are not big fans of
block grants. It seems to be a given that when more money is provided,
greater control over the use of the money is appropriate.
By creating a subsidy that bypasses the appropriations process,73
the federal government is again placing environmental concerns above
other concerns. The reason for this is that a subsidy paid with a tax credit
is paid before anything else. The tax credit reduces revenue, revenue that
is then used to pay for most other expenses of the federal government.
The appropriations process is for distributing the revenue, thus the
environmental projects get "paid for" ahead of almost everything else.
Without further basis, the preference is arbitrary.
With Better America Bonds, the Treasury department is burdened
in two ways. First, regulations must be written to provide the specifics.
For example, if a mutual fund buys Better America Bonds, how will the
tax credits be allocated, if at all, among mutual fund investors? For any
investor, is the tax credit earned as the bond is held, i.e., do investors
receive a pro rata portion of the tax credit depending on the length of time
that the bond was held? Second, the IRS will be forced to evaluate
171 Resnick, supra note 31.
172 Id.
173See id.
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whether the proceeds continue to be used by issuers for allowed uses.' 74
Will the IRS send out inspectors periodically to check on the issuers?
Will this enforcement function be carried out as part of the normal
examination procedures?
The EPA stated that "Better America Bonds is about the simplest
law you could write to do themost good. It's just a quick addition to the
tax code."' 175 What this statement lacks in accuracy it makes up for with
audacity. First of all there is no such thing as a "quick addition" to the
Internal Revenue Code ("Code"). Any change to the Code must get by the
House Ways and Means Committee, the floor of the House, the Senate
Finance Committee, the floor of the Senate, the Joint Committee on
Taxation, and the floors of the House and the Senate again, and finally the
President must sign the bill into law. 176 Certainly "quick" is a relative
term, but clearly liberties were taken when that statement was written.
However, "quick" is quite accurate when compared with the term
"simplest." Revisit note 140, supra, for a small taste of how the Code
provision and accompanying regulations might appear. That rather
lengthy description of the bond requirements is only a portion of the
description of the proposal.' 77 Currently the Code is so complicated that
scholars and commentators use the Code as the standard by which other
complicated laws and regulations are measured. 78  The Better America
Bonds proposal is a step in the wrong direction where simplicity is
concerned.
VI. ALTERNATIVES
The argument against Better America Bonds is strong, perhaps
stronger than the argument in favor. Assuming that the purpose of the
bonds is worthy of attention, a look at the alternatives is necessary.
Reasonable alternatives include paying localities directly, in the form of a
174 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
175 Environmental Protection Agency, Better America Bonds, at http://www.epa.gov/
bonds/ (on file with the William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review).176 See GAIL LEVIN RICHMOND, FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH: GUIDE TO MATERIALS AND
TECHNIQUES 45-47 (5 t1 ed. 1997).177 See generally DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 28.
178 See Martin J. Greenberg, Representation of 'College Coaches in Contract
Negotiations, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 101, 103 (1992) (comparing the complexity of the
NCAA Manual to the Code); Daniel A. Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L.
REv. 1278, 1288 (1993) (comparing the complexity of federal pollution statutes to the
Code); Harvey P. Dale, Tax Accounting for Foreign Persons, 37 TAX L. REv. 275, 275(1981-1982) (stating that the Code is the "most complicated statute in the world").
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grant, an amount equal to their interest obligation; doing nothing, basically
allowing communities to take advantage of tax-exempt bonds and real
estate tax abatements; creating tax preferences for the private sector to
encourage the preservation of open space; or using state revolving funds to
lend money to localities at-no cost.
As mentioned briefly above, tax-credit bonds are basically a direct
subsidy. 79  As such, a simpler approach would be to pay localities
directly. The Joint Committee on Taxation explains as follows:
An alternative, direct expenditure program under direct
control of the EPA would avoid the involvement of the IRS
in the administration of a program outside its traditional
area of expertise. Because potential purchasers of the
bonds must educate themselves as to whether the bonds
qualify for the credit, certain "information costs" are
imposed on the buyer. Additionally, since the
determination as to whether the bond is qualified for the
credit ultimately rests with the Federal Government, further
risk is imposed on the investor. These information costs
and other risks serve to increase the credit rate and hence
the costs to the Federal Government for a given level of
support for environmental improvements. For these
reasons, and the fact that tax credit bonds will be less liquid
than Treasury securities, the bonds would bear a credit rate
that is equal to a measure of the yield on outstanding
corporate bonds. The direct payment of interest by the
Federal Government on behalf of eligible issuers, which
[is] economically the equivalent of the credit proposal,
would be less complex, both as to the substantive tax law,
and as to the administration of the tax law, because the
interest could simply be reported like any other taxable
interest. "0
Unfortunately for the EPA, it would be forced to police its own
program. Frank Hoadley, Wisconsin's capital finance director, summed it
up when he stated the following: "At the end of the day, you have to step
back and say [the tax-credit bond program] is a federal grant program with
179 See supra text accompanying note 64.
180 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 29, at 14.
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a lot of technical rules. The same benefit could be done more simply as a
grant program.'
sl8
Another option is to do nothing. The tax-exempt bond market is
already in place to ease the burden on local borrowing. 2 There is a
question as to why localities should be allowed to borrow for free. If the
federal government stays out of the way, communities can undertake
whatever projects they desire, even if the project fails to fall into the
category of those projects the federal government desires. In addition,
localities could offer real estate abatements to the private sector, allowing
them to be in control of deciding which entities and which projects would
qualify.
Similarly, the federal government could offer tax preferences to the
private sector. A tax preference would give companies a financial
incentive to convert idle land into preserves or parks. In addition, "[t]he
Internal Revenue Code is [already] peppered with provisions to limit
suburban development."'' 8 3 The major flaw with federal tax preferences is
that the localities are completely out of the loop. They would have no
direct control of the program.
Finally, the State Revolving Funds ("SRFs") could be used to
provide interest-free loans to localities. SRFs "have already provided
about $30 billion in low-interest loans to localities, and have generated
about $12 billion in tax-exempt bonds" for clean water and drinking water
projects.18 4  James Smith, retired executive director of the Council of
Infrastructure Financing Authorities and the driving force behind the
creation of SRFs, stated the following:
[Y]ou can use [State Revolving Funds] to accomplish
basically the same purpose as the administration has
proposed with the Better America Bonds. You can give
zero-interest loans through [State Revolving Funds], and
what Better America Bonds would do presumably is to
181 Resnick, supra note 166.
182 See supra note 170.
183 Andrea Foster, It Ain't Easy Being Green, but Now Congress is Gearing Up to Assist,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 8, 1999. Currently there are provisions for reductions in estate taxes for
donation of conservation easements and for deductions for charitable contributions of
land for conservation purposes, and the Brownfields Tax Incentive Act of 1997 allows
owners of brownfields to expense currently the year's full cost of cleaning a site rather
than capitalizing the cost and depreciating it over several years. See id.
184 See Ola Kinnander, Q&A: Mr. Smith Leaves Washington and Reflects on Public
Finance, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 20, 1999, available at 1999 WL 29982365.
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provide a low-cost level of financing for communities to
buy and protect lands for environmental and recreational
needs. You have a ready-made tool with [State Revolving
Funds]. You don't have to go out into the bond market and
try to create a whole new mechanism that hasn't really been
tried yet-and there are questions about how efficient it
would work. 1
85
Thus, through SRFs, a system is already in place to provide interest-free
loans to communities. l8 In fact, many states are leveraging their SRF
funds by issuing tax-exempt bonds and using the SRF money to pay the
interest on the bonds, but the uses for the bond proceeds remain limited to
the underlying uses of the SRF money, namely drinking water programs
and wastewater programs.' 
87
If the allowed uses of the SRFs were expanded to include other
environmental programs, or if new SRFs were created for environmental
programs generally, the resulting program would possess the best quality
of Better America Bonds (a deep subsidy), and overcome some of the key
disadvantages of Better America Bonds. For instance, if the SRFs are
leveraged by issuing tax-exempt bonds, the "deep subsidy" touted by the
EPA188 is preserved because the localities would use the SRF money to
pay the bond interest. In addition, because the EPA would not be
choosing the projects deemed worthy, the localities would retain control.
Furthermore, the problems inherent in tax-credit bonds, such as the lack of
a market and probability that the borrowing would not actually be tax free,
are avoided.
185 Id.
186 State Revolving Funds referred to above are those that are funded by federal and state
grants. There are currently two types: wastewater SRFs and drinking water SRFs. See
Ola Kinnander, Q&A: CIFA's New President Discusses Goals, THE BOND BUYER, Nov.
16, 1998, available at 1998 WL 13147082. SRFs are used to provide low-interest loans
to local governments for wastewater and drinking water facilities, and the repayments are
returned to the SRFs so that the SRFs can operate in perpetuity. See Ola Kinnander, EPA
Takes Anti-Bond Stance, THE BOND BUYER, Aug. 19, 1999, available at 1999 WL
19924864.
187 See Ola Kinnander & Lynn Stevens Hume, Board May Push for Expanded SRF Uses,
THE BOND BUYER, Sept. 25, 1998, available at 1998 WL 13145548.
188 See Better America Bonds, supra note 19.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Environmental goals such as enhancing and preserving open space,
protecting and improving water quality, and cleaning up and finding new
uses for brownfields are certainly worthy, important projects that should
be encouraged. However, using Better America Bonds as the carrot is not
the best method. There is already in place a program to provide localities
with a method for borrowing interest free. SRFs would keep the control of
environmental projects in the hands of localities without the hazards
associated with tax-credit bonds. It is completely unnecessary to create a
separate program to be overseen by at least two agencies of the federal
government when better results can be reached by using SRFs. Better
America Bonds should be scrapped in favor of an expanded State
Revolving Fund program.
